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  A growing body of evidence indicates that health insurance promotes health 
(Levy and Meltzer 2001).  This seems to be particularly true among children and low-
income adults (Brook, et al. 1983; Keeler, et al. 1985; Lurie et al. 1986; Currie and 
Gruber 1997).  Because of the important links between health insurance and health, the 
lack of insurance among 41.2 million Americans --a disproportionate number of whom 
are poor--is widely regarded as a pressing public policy issue. 
  One reason for low coverage among the low-income population is that low-wage 
employers, who employ a disproportionate share of low-income workers, often do not 
provide their workers with coverage.  Even among firms that do, evidence suggests that 
low wage workers often are unwilling to pay the price of insurance that they and their 
employers face (Long and Marquis, 1992). Individual coverage obtained directly from 
insurers is more expensive still. 
  Furthermore, until recently, public coverage under Medicaid was not generally 
available to working families.  Historically, most families had to receive welfare in order 
to be eligible for Medicaid coverage.
1  Between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s, poor 
children increasingly became eligible for Medicaid under the so-called poverty-related 
eligibility expansions, which extended eligibility to children in non-welfare families who 
                                                 
1 Exceptions are coverage through the Medicaid Medically Needy Program (MN) and the Supplemental 
Security Income program (SSI). In 2000, 35 states offered a MN program which covers persons who do not 
meet the applicable income or resource requirements for categorically needy eligibility but who, largely 
because they have incurred considerable medical costs, may become eligible. Thirty-two states and the 
District of Columbia automatically provide Medicaid coverage to the poor disabled who are eligible for SSI 
benefits. Both programs, however, constitute only a small portion of total Medicaid enrollment: the former 
3.6 million (8 percent) and the latter 5.3 million (12 percent).    2
met income-eligibility limits determined by state and federal governments.
2  The State 
Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), which was introduced in 1997, expanded 
children's eligibility further still.  However, with the exception of pregnant women, adults 
remained largely ineligible for Medicaid unless they received welfare or were disabled. 
  Beginning in the 1990s, a number of states began expanding eligibility to low-
income parents who were not receiving welfare.  The impetus for many of these 
expansions was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 (PRWORA).  PRWORA is best known for replacing the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program.  However, PRWORA also required states to formally separate 
Medicaid eligibility from welfare eligibility by replacing their AFDC-related eligibility 
criteria with so-called "family eligibility" criteria.  Although many states merely 
established new family eligibility criteria for Medicaid that were identical to their old 
AFDC-related eligibility criteria, several states used the new flexibility granted them 
under PRWORA to raise the income-eligibility limits for adults well beyond their former 
levels.  Other states expanded eligibility under research and demonstration waivers. 
  In this paper, we analyze how these parental-eligibility expansions affected 
insurance coverage.  We base the analysis on data from the March annual demographic 
supplement of the Current Population Survey and focus on expansions implemented 
between 1996 and 2001.  We estimate first how the expansions have affected Medicaid 
coverage among adults.  To determine whether Medicaid coverage crowded out private 
                                                 
2 As a whole, the child-eligibility expansions increased child coverage, although different components of 
those expansions had different effects.  See Currie and Gruber (1996), Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2000), 
Card and Shore-Sheppard (2001).   3
coverage, we estimate the effect of the expansions on private coverage and the likelihood 
of having any coverage.   
We also estimate whether there were spillover effects on the coverage of children.  
The parental eligibility expansions did not expand eligibility for children, because 
income-eligibility limits for children under the poverty-related Medicaid expansions and 
SCHIP were generally higher than those under the parental-eligibility expansions.  
Nevertheless, the parental-eligibility expansions may have raised the benefit to low-
income parents of applying for coverage, since both the adults and the children could 
become insured.  If so, the parental-eligibility expansions potentially could increase child 
coverage as well as adult coverage. 
Finally, we ask whether the effect of the parental eligibility expansions varies by 
race and ethnicity.  Wages and occupations vary by race and ethnicity, which may affect 
availability of employer-provided coverage.  Marriage rates vary as well, which may 
affect the likelihood of coverage under a spouse's employer-provided policy.  Depending 
on how the effects of the parental eligibility expansions vary by race and ethnicity, the 
expansions could either reduce or exacerbate differentials in health care coverage. 
  One of the key challenges in estimating the effects of the parental-eligibility 
expansions is distinguishing the effects of the expansions themselves from the effects of 
other, potentially unobservable factors that might simultaneously influence both health 
insurance coverage on the one hand and state policy choices on the other.  In the welfare 
reform literature, this has been referred to as the "policy endogeneity" problem.  This 
issue is of particular concern in the policy environment of the 1990s, in which states not   4
only expanded parental Medicaid eligibility, but reformed their welfare programs and 
implemented SCHIP as well. 
  Previous studies vary in the extent to which they have attempted to deal with this 
problem.  Some studies compare insurance coverage in expansion states to coverage in 
non-expansion states.  Such cross-sectional comparisons provide no controls for 
unobservable influences that may result in policy endogeneity, even when they account 
for observable factors by employing regression methods.  Other studies compare within-
state changes over time between expansion and non-expansion states.  Another uses a 
difference-in-difference, or state fixed-effects approach, comparing deviations from state-
level means between expansion and non-expansion states.  These latter two approaches 
provide some control for policy endogeneity in that they implicitly control for state-level 
unobservables that do not vary over time.  However, our concern is that, in the volatile 
policy environment of the 1990s, state policy choices may have been influenced by 
unobservable factors that were changing over time.  For this reason, we adopt an 
alternative approach that controls implicitly for arbitrarily time-varying unobservables 
within a state. 
  To do this we focus only on the expansion states, and define two groups of 
families according to states' pre- and post-expansion Medicaid-eligibility criteria.  One is 
the target group, defined as families whose incomes lie between the AFDC-related 
income eligibility limit and 200 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL).  Adults in these 
families would have been income-ineligible for welfare, and thus for Medicaid, prior to 
the expansion, but many of them would have become eligible for Medicaid as a result of 
the expansion.  The other group is the below-target group, whose incomes fall below the   5
AFDC income-eligibility limit.  These groups would have been income-eligible for 
Medicaid both before and after the expansion.  As a result, their coverage should not 
change as a result of the parental-eligibility expansions.
3  We construct our estimates of 
the effect of the parental eligibility expansions by comparing post-expansion changes in 
coverage differentials between the target group and the below-target group.  Since these 
between-group coverage differentials can be computed within cells defined by state and 
year, our approach implicitly controls for all arbitrarily time-varying state-specific factors 
that may potentially influence both insurance coverage and state policy choices. 
  In the next section of the paper, we discuss the parental eligibility expansions in 
more detail and review the few previous studies that have analyzed their effects.  In 
section III we discuss the data.  Section IV describes our empirical strategy more 
formally; section V presents our results.  Section VI concludes. 
II. Background 
A. Parental Medicaid Expansions 
As noted above, historically most adults were eligible for Medicaid  only if they 
received AFDC.  As such, eligibility was limited to single mothers with very low income.  
Beginning in 1984, the federal government authorized a series of expansions for pregnant 
women and their infants.  By 1989, states were required to cover pregnant women up to 
75 percent of the FPL, later increased to 133 percent under OBRA 1989.  States could 
optionally extend coverage to pregnant women with incomes up to 185 percent of the 
FPL. 
                                                 
3 Several states relaxed the so-called 100-hour rule at the same time that they expanded their parental-
eligibility thresholds.  This could have made previously-ineligible married couples eligible for Medicaid in 
both the target and below-target groups.  If relaxing the 100-hour rule increased coverage within the below-
target group, then our estimates would understate the effects of the parental-eligibility expansions on the 
target group.   6
More general parental-eligibility expansions began in the early 1990s.  In 1992, 
Washington and Minnesota expanded eligibility to low-income parents (and children) 
through state-funded health insurance programs. These expansions were quite broad, 
including families with incomes up to 250 percent and 275 percent of the FPL, 
respectively.  Shortly thereafter, three states received federal waivers to extend Medicaid 
eligibility to poor parents who did not receive welfare.  These expansions were also broad 
in scope, raising eligibility to 100 percent of the FPL in Oregon, 300 percent in Hawaii 
and as high as 400 percent in Tennessee.  
  For two important reasons, we do not focus on these early, broad expansions in 
our analysis below.  First, the fiscal burden imposed by these programs led two states to 
sharply retract eligibility.  Tennessee scaled back its original expansion after only one 
year, and now extends eligibility only to those who meet federally mandated Medicaid 
eligibility standards and dislocated workers. Hawaii also scaled back its original 
expansion from 300 percent to 100 percent of the FPL in 1998.  The effects of programs 
that experience such retrenchment may be quite different from those of programs that can 
be sustained.  
  Second, the March CPS substantially changed the way it asked questions about 
health coverage starting in 1995.  This presents a data consistency problem which can 
only be solved easily by using post-1994 data.  As a result, the early, broad expansions 
would contribute at most one year of pre-reform data to the analysis, limiting their 
usefulness. 
  Instead, we focus on the expansions that took place between 1996 and 2001 in the 
24 states listed in Table 1.  The table lists the state, the year in which the expansion took   7
place, and the pre- and post-expansion income eligibility limits, expressed as a 
percentage of the FPL in the year in which the expansion was implemented.  The data on 
the expansion years and income-eligibility thresholds are taken from a number of 
sources, including Maloy et al. (2002), Broaddus, et al. (2002), Holohan and Pohl (2002), 
Krebs-Carter and Holohan (2000), Guyer and Mann (1999), and Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (2003). 
  The pre-expansion income eligibility level (IEL) is based on the AFDC net 
income test, which required the family's income to be less than the AFDC payment 
standard plus deductions and disregards.  Monthly deductions and disregards include $90 
for work expenses, $175 per child under age 6 for child care expenses, and an earnings 
disregard of $30 plus 1/3 of earnings in excess of $30.  The IEL in the third column of 
Table 1 is equal to the sum of the state payment standard plus those deductions and 
disregards, expressed relative to the FPL. 
  In many states, the post-expansion IEL is expressed explicitly in terms of the 
FPL.  In others, it can be derived from a formula that compares income to a payment 
standard plus deductions and disregards.  Several states effectively raised their income-
eligibility limits by implementing more generous earnings disregards.
 4 
  Table 1 shows that the AFDC-based pre-expansion IEL's in these 24 states 
averaged 74 percent of the FPL.  Their post-expansion IEL's averaged 115 percent of the 
FPL.  Based on the 2001 FPL of $14,630 for a family of three, this amounts to expanding 
the eligibility limit from just under $11,000 to almost $17,000. 
                                                 
4 Five states (Maryland, Nebraska, North Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming) changed their earnings 
disregards in such a way that some families' eligibility limits may have risen, whereas others actually could 
have fallen.  We exclude states with such ambiguous expansions from the analysis.   8
  B. Previous Research 
Four previous studies have analyzed the effects of the parental eligibility 
expansions.  Because some of these analyses are limited to the broad parental eligibility 
expansions that took place prior to 1996, their findings may not generalize to the more 
recent expansions that were generally more moderate in size.  Furthermore, none of the 
previous analyses present results disaggregated by race or ethnicity.  Nevertheless, it may 
be useful to summarize their results here.   
Ku and Broaddus (2000) compare child Medicaid coverage in Hawaii, Oregon 
and Tennessee to states that did not implement any expansion.  They find that the states 
with broad expansions experienced a 16 percentage point increase in child coverage from 
1990 to 1998, compared to three percent in states that did not implement an expansion.  
For parents, the authors found that Medicaid coverage increased four percentage points in 
those states with broad expansions, but declined by eight percentage points in those 
without an expansion.  However, since the authors provide no controls for other policies 
that could affect Medicaid coverage, many of which changed between 1990 and 1998, it 
seems unlikely that this analysis truly isolates the effects of the parental-eligibility 
expansions.   
Lambrew (2001) examines the impact of more recent expansions on Medicaid 
coverage among children and adults.  Based on a cross-state comparison of three-year 
state averages calculated from the March 1998 – March 2000 CPS, the results indicate  
that those states that extended eligibility to parents above the poverty threshold have 
nearly half the child uninsured rates of those states that had not extended parental 
eligibility.  However, if the expansion states differ from other states in other ways that   9
affect Medicaid coverage, then cross-state comparisons may not identify the effects of 
parental-eligibility expansions.  
Dubay and Kenney (2001) use the 1997 and 1999 waves of the National Survey 
of American Families to estimate the impact of adult Medicaid expansions on child 
Medicaid coverage in eleven states.  The authors conduct two analyses, one comparing 
coverage rates between states, and another comparing rates within the state of 
Massachusetts before and after implementation of an expansion.  In their cross-state 
analysis, they compare child Medicaid coverage rates for 1999 in those states that had 
expanded coverage by 1999 (nine states) with participation rates in those states that had 
not (two states). Estimating linear probability models, the authors find 20 percent higher 
coverage rates in those states with an expansion. Of course, this analysis is subject to the 
same criticism as that of Lambrew (2001), which is that underlying state differences 
related to the decision to expand family coverage may be correlated with Medicaid 
participation, thereby biasing the results. Likewise, in a single-state study, it is impossible 
to isolate the effects of the policy change from the effects of state-specific unobservable 
that are correlated with both the policy change and coverage rates.  
  Most recently, Duchovny and Busch (2002) employ a state fixed-effects approach 
to compare adult insurance coverage in 21 states that expanded parental eligibility to at 
least 100 percent of the FPL to coverage in the remaining states.  They report that such 
expansions increased adult coverage by about 3 percentage points.  As discussed above, 
the state fixed-effects approach identifies the effects of the parental eligibility expansions 
only if any unobservable influences that may be correlated with state policy choices are 
time-invariant.     10
III.  Empirical Approach 
  An important difference between the approach we adopt here and the approach 
adopted by others is that we include only expansion states in our analysis.  Comparing the 
target and below-target groups within expansion states allows us to relax the assumption, 
implicit in the state fixed-effects approach, that the unobservable determinants of state 
policy choices are time-invariant.  As a result, out approach provides more general 
controls for potential policy endogeneity. 
  Our empirical model can be written as 
ist st ist st ist st ist ist Z X T X T C e a g b b b + + + + + = 3 2 1         (1) 
The dependent variable Cist is a dummy indicating whether the ith sample member in the 
sth state at time t has coverage, where coverage may mean Medicaid, private, or any 
coverage, depending on the model.  The variable Tist is the target-group dummy, which is 
equal to one if the ith family's income exceeded the sth state's AFDC-related income 
eligibility limit.  In years prior to the expansion, the AFDC-related IEL is based on the 
AFDC payment standard, deductions, and disregards in effect in year t.  In years 
following the expansion, the AFDC-related IEL is based on the value of those parameters 
in the year prior to the expansion.  The variable Xst is the expansion dummy, which is  
equal to one in state s beginning with the year of the expansion.  It is equal to zero in 
years preceding the expansion.  The term TistXst is an interaction between the target-group 
dummy and the expansion dummy.  The coefficient on this key interaction term provides 
our estimate of the effect of the parental Medicaid expansions.  The vector Zist represents 
family characteristics, such as the mother's age, education, race, and number of children; 
the age of her youngest child; and a dummy indicating whether she was recently   11
pregnant.  The child regressions also include the child's age and a dummy for whether she 
is an infant. 
  The disturbance term consists of two components, ast and eist.  The latter is an 
idiosyncratic family-specific error term.  The former, ast, is a term common to all families 
within a particular state during year t.  It represents the influence of all arbitrarily time-
varying characteristics of the state that could simultaneously affect coverage and the 
timing of the state's parental-eligibility expansion.  This includes other policy choices, 
such as the timing and nature of the state's welfare reform plan, its Medicaid and SCHIP 
eligibility rules for children, as well as other influences, such as the condition of the state 
economy.  Including dummy variables for each state-year cell in the regression models 
provides implicit controls for all such factors.  Because the estimates are based on 
between-group differentials within expansion states in the context of a model that 
controls for state and year effects, we refer to them as " within-state difference-in-
difference" estimates. 
  In the presence of state-year dummy variables, the parameter associated with the 
expansion dummy is not identified.  Indeed, none of the effects of any variable that varies 
only by state and year, such as welfare reform, the unemployment rate, or the generosity 
of other state-sponsored health insurance programs, can be identified, since such 
variables are collinear with the state-year dummies.  This reveals why the state-year 
dummies control for policy endogeneity: they control implicitly for all factors that vary at 
the state level, regardless how they may vary over time. 
  One possibility not accounted for by the model in equation (1) is that some factors 
may have different effects on the target and below-target groups.  Welfare reform is a   12
particularly important example.  Since families in the target group are generally income-
ineligible for welfare, welfare reform should have little direct effect on them.  However, 
given the important historical links between welfare and Medicaid coverage, one might 
expect welfare reform to have important effects on the coverage of the below-target 
group, whose members are income-eligible for welfare by construction. 
  Failing to account for such a possibility could bias our results.  To account for this 
problem, we interact the target-group dummy with a welfare reform dummy as well as 
the annual state unemployment rate and, in the child regressions, the income-eligibility 
thresholds associated with the state's poverty-related Medicaid and SCHIP programs.  
The welfare reform dummy is equal to one beginning with the year in which the state 
implemented its TANF program; poverty-related Medicaid and SCHIP income-eligibility 
thresholds are expressed relative to the FPL.  We include these interactions in all the 
regression models reported below. 
IV. Data 
  Data on insurance coverage are taken from the March CPS surveys administered 
between 1995 and 2002.  Because the surveys provide information regarding coverage in 
the previous calendar year, the sample period extends effectively from 1994 to 2001.  As 
mentioned above, the CPS insurance coverage questions were changed in 1995.  The 
questions were reordered, question wording changed and questions on coverage through 
“other health insurance plans” were added.
5  In addition, the sample frame was updated in 
1995 (as it is every decade to reflect changes in the population distribution uncovered by 
                                                 
5 Of particular relevance to this study, the question wording with respect to Medicaid coverage changed 
from “during the previous year, were you covered by Medicaid?” prior to 1995 to “at any time during 1994, 
were you covered by Medicaid, the government assistance program that pays for health care?” beginning in 
1995. In addition, specific state program names for Medicaid were provided beginning in 1995 (eg: 
MediCal in California, Medi-Kan in Kansas, etc).    13
the decennial census).  How these changes affected estimates of health insurance 
coverage has been explored elsewhere.  Swartz (1997) finds no increases in the number 
of people with Medicaid coverage between 1994 and 1995, increases in the number of 
people with CHAMPUS/VA/Military coverage as well as employer-sponsored coverage, 
despite declines in military personnel and increases in Medicaid caseloads as reported in 
administrative data.  As such, to maintain continuity and eliminate the possibility that 
changes in the questionnaire might contribute to the estimated changes in coverage that 
we attribute to the parental Medicaid expansions, we limit our study to analysis of CPS 
data collected from 1995 to 2002.  
  We limit our sample to mothers and children with family income below 200 
percent of the FPL.  This corresponds to the post-expansion IEL of the District of 
Columbia, which provides the most generous parental Medicaid eligibility.
6   
  Table 2 provides insurance coverage rates from our sample of low-income 
families.  For both mothers and children, we provide estimated coverage rates both before 
and after the parental-eligibility expansions.  We consider Medicaid coverage, private 
coverage, and any coverage, defined as coverage from either Medicaid or a private plan. 
  Panel A provides coverage rates for Medicaid.  Before the eligibility expansions, 
Medicaid covered 43.4 percent of mothers and 55.9 percent of children in the below-
target group, that is, in families with incomes below the AFDC-related IEL.  The 
difference in coverage is probably related to differences in eligibility.  Before the parental 
                                                 
6 We exclude from the sample families in which anyone receives SSI or "other government insurance" 
which largely includes coverage through the military and Medicare.  Coverage under both types is subject 
to policy changes that are independent of the adult Medicaid expansions studied here but may have 
occurred at roughly the same time.  As such we exclude both categories so as better isolate the effect of the 
adult Medicaid expansions.  
   14
eligibility expansions, coverage for mothers was generally limited to mothers receiving 
welfare.  In contrast, children could have been either welfare-eligible or eligible under the 
poverty-related eligibility expansions. 
For mothers below the AFDC-related IEL, post-expansion coverage fell by 4.7 
percentage points.  Clearly, this decline cannot be attributed to the parental-eligibility 
expansion per se.  Some analysts have attributed the decline in Medicaid coverage 
between 1995 and 1997 to the effects of welfare reform.  This is consistent with a number 
of studies showing that many former welfare recipients did not retain their Medicaid 
coverage after they left the welfare rolls, even though some may have remained eligible 
for Medicaid under the Transitional Medical Assistance program, which provided for up 
to 12 months of Medicaid eligibility for families that lost welfare eligibility due to an 
increase in earnings.
7  In contrast, child coverage changed very little.   
The difference in the post-expansion Medicaid coverage of mothers and their 
children may have to do with differences in non-welfare eligibility between the two 
groups.  Virtually all the children in the below-target group would have been eligible for 
Medicaid under the poverty-related expansions starting in the early 1990s, well before 
welfare reform.  Thus children leaving welfare could have retained Medicaid eligibility 
fairly seamlessly, at least in principle.  In contrast, non-welfare mothers would have 
become eligible for Medicaid only after their state implemented parental-eligibility 
expansions.  In most states, the parental-eligibility expansions were put in place well after 
welfare reform, which may have resulted in a period of non-eligibility for many of these 
mothers. 
                                                 
7 Low rates of take-up in the transitional Medicaid program is typically attributed to lack of familiarity 
among former welfare recipients with the program and stringent financial reporting requirements (GAO-
02-679T).   15
Among mothers in the target group, that is, among those with incomes above the 
AFDC-related IEL, 8.7 percent had Medicaid coverage in the pre-expansion period.  This 
could reflect coverage during pregnancy or under the Medically Needy eligibility 
category.  Alternatively, it may reflect a type of measurement error.  Medicaid eligibility 
is determined on the basis of monthly income.  Thus a family could be welfare-eligible 
one month but leave the rolls the next month due to an earnings gain.  However, the 
Medicaid coverage variable in the CPS indicates whether the respondent was covered at 
any time in the previous year.  Likewise, the CPS provides a measure of annual income, 
from which we construct a measure of average monthly income that we use to assign 
families to the target or below-target groups.  Some families could have been eligible for 
part of the year, but have enough average monthly income over the year so as to appear 
income-ineligible based on the income measure available in the CPS.  Coverage among 
children was substantially higher during the pre-expansion period, at 16.9 percent.  Many 
of the children in this group would have been eligible for Medicaid under the poverty-
related eligibility expansions. 
Medicaid coverage among mothers in the target group rose by 3 percentage 
points, to 11.7 percent, after the parental-eligibility expansions were implemented.  
Among target-group children, Medicaid coverage rose by 8.4 percentage points, to 25.3 
percent.  This contrasts with decreases in coverage among mothers and children in the 
below-target group of 4.7 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively.   
A simple within-state difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of the 
parental-eligibility expansions can be constructed by subtracting the change in coverage   16
within the below-target group from the change in coverage within the target group.
8  The 
resulting estimate suggests that the parental-eligibility expansions increased maternal 
coverage by 7.7 percentage points and child coverage by 8.9 percentage points.  Of 
course, if factors such as welfare reform affected the target and below-target groups 
differently, then this simple estimate may overstate the effects of the parental eligibility 
expansions.  
Private coverage rates are presented in Panel B.  Within the below-target group, 
private coverage rose for both mothers and children.  This is consistent with other reports 
of increasing private coverage among low-income families during much of our sample 
period (Broaddus, et al., 2002).  Among target-group mothers, private coverage rose less; 
among target-group children, it fell.  Relative to the below-target groups, private maternal 
coverage fell 3.5 percentage points and private child coverage fell by 4.8 percentage 
points.  In the absence of other influences that may have affected private coverage, this 
would suggest that the parental-eligibility expansions were responsible for some 
crowding-out of private coverage.  
Finally, Panel C presents rates of coverage from either private sources or 
Medicaid.  The simple within-state difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the 
probability of having any coverage among both mothers and children rose by about 4 
percentage points.  As a whole, the difference-in-difference estimates in Table 2 suggest 
that the parental-eligibility expansions increased insurance coverage by raising Medicaid 
coverage while reducing private coverage by a lesser amount.  Of course, these estimates 
are valid only if the parental-eligibility expansions were the only factor influencing 
                                                 
8  This is equivalent to the estimate that one would obtain by estimating equation (1) subject to the 
constraint that ? = 0.   17
coverage differentials between the target and below-target groups.  However, as we 
argued above, welfare reform, the economy, and the implementation of SCHIP could 
have affected insurance coverage differently between the two groups.  In the next section, 
we present estimates that control for such differences. 
V. Results 
Table 3 presents results from the regression models discussed in section III.  We 
focus first on the results for mothers, presented in columns (1) through (3).  The 
coefficients on the target group dummy, presented in the first row, show that mothers in 
the target group are less likely to receive Medicaid than their counterparts in the omitted 
below-target group.  They are much more likely to have private coverage and somewhat 
more likely to have any coverage.
  
The coefficients on the interaction between the target-group dummy and the post-
expansion dummy presented in the second row provide our regression estimates of the 
effects of the parental-eligibility expansions.
 9  On average, the expansions increased 
maternal Medicaid coverage by a statistically significant 2.7 percentage points.  At the 
same time, the expansions reduced private maternal coverage by 1.3 percentage points, 
although this crowd-out effect is insignificant.  The increase in any maternal coverage 
resulting from the parental eligibility expansions was 1.4 percentage points.   
The next row of Table 3 suggests why the regression estimate of the effect of the 
parental-eligibility expansions on Medicaid coverage is smaller than the simple within-
state difference-in-difference estimate presented in Table 2.  In column (1), the 
coefficient on the interaction between the target-group dummy and the welfare reform 
                                                 
9  Recall that the coefficient on the post-expansion dummy is not identified because the post-expansion 
varies only by state and year.   18
dummy is positive and significant.  Taken at face value, it indicates that welfare reform 
raised Medicaid coverage within the target group, relative to the below-target group, by 
5.9 percentage points.  Put equivalently and more intuitively, it indicates that welfare 
reform reduced Medicaid within the below-target group, relative to the target group, by 
5.9 percentage points.  Since the target-group was income-ineligible for welfare, and thus 
unlikely to be directly affected by welfare reform, this estimate suggests that welfare 
reform reduced maternal Medicaid coverage within the income-eligible population by 
nearly 6 percentage points.  This is roughly consistent with estimates from some welfare 
reform experiments (Grogger, Karoly, and Klerman 2002, chapter 6). 
Accounting for the effect of welfare reform on the below-target group explains 
why the estimate of the effect of the parental Medicaid expansions on maternal Medicaid 
coverage is so much smaller than the simple within-state difference-in-difference 
estimate in Table 2.  The simple estimate attributes the entire post-expansion change in 
between-group coverage differentials to the parental eligibility expansions.  The 
regression estimate attributes the decline in coverage within the below-target group to 
welfare reform, and attributes only the net change in between-group coverage 
differentials to the parental Medicaid expansions.
10 
In the next row of the table, the coefficients on the target group-unemployment 
interaction indicates that the economy had similar effects on mothers in both the target 
and below-target groups.  Beyond that, the signs of the other coefficients in the model are 
                                                 
10  We also fit models where we replaced the reform-target group interaction with an interaction between 
the target-group dummy and the log of the state's welfare caseload.  The idea is that the welfare caseload 
may provide a more comprehensive measure of the effects of welfare reform than a single reform dummy, 
since the caseload would subsume the effects of the heterogeneous reforms that were implemented across 
the states.  The estimated effects of the parental expansions from those alternative specifications were 
similar to the estimates reported here.   19
generally in accord with what one might expect based on previous research.  Compared 
with college graduates (the omitted education group), less educated mothers and their 
children are more likely to receive Medicaid and less likely to have private health 
insurance.  Compared with mothers over age 50, younger mothers are generally more 
likely to receive Medicaid and less likely to have private coverage.  Single mothers are 
more likely to receive Medicaid and less likely to have private insurance than married 
mothers.  Within the population of families whose incomes are less than 200 percent of 
the FPL, they are more likely to have any coverage than married mothers.  Mothers with 
smaller families are less likely to have Medicaid coverage or any coverage than mothers 
with larger families.  Black mothers are substantially more likely than whites to have 
Medicaid coverage and less likely to have private coverage.  On net, they are slightly but 
significantly more likely to have any coverage.  In contrast, Hispanic mothers are no 
more likely than whites to have Medicaid coverage, but are substantially less likely to 
have private coverage.  As a result, they are less likely to have any coverage.  Recently 
pregnant mothers, defined as those with a child age zero or one, are more likely to have 
Medicaid coverage, presumably because they qualify under the provisions for pregnant 
women.   
  Estimates for children are reported in columns (4) through (6) of Table 3.  With 
only a few exceptions, the estimates in the children's coverage regressions are 
qualitatively similar to those in the maternal coverage regressions.  Like their mothers, 
children in the target group are less likely to have Medicaid coverage, more likely to have 
private coverage, and more likely to have any coverage than children in the omitted 
below-target group.  The adult eligibility expansions increased children's Medicaid   20
coverage, had insignificant crowd-out effects on private coverage, and raised any 
coverage.  The interactions between the target group dummy and the welfare reform 
dummy are insignificant, suggesting that children were less affected by welfare reform 
than their mothers.  This is consistent with the availability of Medicaid coverage for 
children under the poverty-related Medicaid expansions and with the data from Table 2, 
which show little change in Medicaid coverage within the below-target group at the time 
of the parental Medicaid expansions.  Mother and family demographics have qualitatively 
similar effects on maternal and child coverage, as a rule.  Child coverage from all sources 
falls with the child's age; infants are additionally likely to have Medicaid coverage,  
probably the result of the eligibility provisions for pregnant women and their infants.  
Neither the Medicaid nor CHIP income-eligibility have significantly different effects on 
the coverage of children in the target group, relative to those in the below-target group. 
  Despite the general qualitative similarities between the maternal and child 
coverage results, there is an important quantitative difference.  The estimated effects of 
the parental eligibility expansions are greater for children than for their parents.  
Although this potentially could be the result of disproportionate take-up among large 
families, some analysis revealed that it resulted largely from inappropriately pooling the 
data by race and ethnicity.   
Table 4 presents results disaggregated by race and ethnicity, where only the key 
coefficients are shown in order to save space.
11  Once the sample is stratified, the effects 
of the parental Medicaid expansions are more similar between mothers and their children.  
                                                 
11  The unusual racial/ethnic distributions implicit in the sample sizes stem from the fact that we include 
only expansion states in the sample.  The presence of California and New York account for the relative 
abundance of Hispanics; the near-absence of Southern states accounts for the relative dearth of blacks.  We 
have omitted a fourth "other race/ethnicity" group from Table 4 due to small sample sizes.   21
Some further analysis revealed that the differences that remain can be explained by the 
fact that the expansions had larger effects on larger families, suggesting that take-up rates 
were larger for families with more children. 
More importantly, disaggregating the sample by race and ethnicity reveals that the 
effects of the parental Medicaid expansions vary importantly along these lines.  The 
expansions slightly reduced coverage of white mothers and slightly increased coverage of 
white children.  However, none of these effects are significant  In contrast, the 
expansions had substantial effects on both blacks and Hispanics.   
The parental eligibility expansions increased Medicaid coverage by nearly 7 
percentage points among black mothers and by nearly 8 percentage points among their 
children.  The likelihood of any insurance rose by 4.4 percentage points for mothers and 
6.3 percentage points for children.  Most of these estimates are at least marginally 
significant, despite limited sample sizes. 
Among Hispanics, the parental eligibility expansions increased Medicaid 
coverage by 4.8 percentage points among mothers and 6.7 percentage points among their 
children.  Both of these effects are significant at conventional levels.  The parental 
eligibility expansions increased the likelihood of any coverage by 4.2 percentage points 
for mothers and 3 percentage points for children. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explain why these 
differences arise, we offer one suggestion.  In the pre-expansion period, 73.5 percent of 
white mothers in the target group had private insurance coverage.  Among black and 
Hispanic mothers, the respective percentages were 65.3 and 49.4.  To the extent that 
demand for public coverage is increased by lack of private coverage, these pre-existing   22
differences in private coverage may help explain the differential effects of the parental 
Medicaid expansions. 
We can also calculate the extent to which the parental eligibility expansions 
altered racial and ethnic disparities in insurance coverage.  In the pre-expansion period, 
81.2 percent of white mothers in the target group had some sort of insurance coverage.  
Among black and Hispanic mothers, the corresponding percentages were 78.1 and 57.7.  
On the basis of the estimates in column (3) of table 4, predicted post-expansion coverage 
rates, assuming that the expansions were the only factor affecting insurance rates, would 
have been 79.9 percent for whites, 82.5 percent for blacks, and 61.9 percent for 
Hispanics.  Thus by themselves, the parental Medicaid expansions would have closed the 
black-white insurance gap among the target group entirely, and would have reduced the 
white-Hispanic insurance gap from 23.5 percentage points to 18 percentage points. 
Among target-group children, pre-expansion insurance coverage rates were 83.9 
percent for whites, 85.3 percent for blacks, and 69.9 percent for Hispanics.  Ceteris 
paribus predicted values for the post-expansion period, based on the estimates in column 
(6) of table 4, are 86.4 percent for whites, 91.6 percent for blacks, and 72.9 percent for 
Hispanics.  Thus by themselves, the parental eligibility expansions would have further 
expanded the white-black coverage gap among the target group in favor of blacks and 
would have reduced the white-Hispanic gap slightly, from 14 percentage points to 13.5 
percentage points. 
VI. Conclusions 
Since the 1990s, many states have sought to expand eligibility for Medicaid to 
poor parents who were not receiving welfare.  Our results show modest increases in    23
health insurance coverage as a result of the expansions. There also appear to be 
considerable spillover effects with respect to insurance coverage among children of 
newly eligible parents.   
Our results also show substantial differences in the effects of the parental 
eligibility expansions by race.  Whereas the expansions had little effect on whites, they 
had significant and generally sizeable effects on blacks and Hispanics.  As a result, the 
expansions generally contribute to reducing racial differences in insurance coverage.  
Among children, they expand the slight advantage faced by black children as compared 
to whites. 
  Whether the recent gains in coverage are likely to persist is not clear.  Recent 
growth in unemployment presumably would increase take-up, as newly jobless families 
lose access to employer-provided coverage.  At the same time, however, pressing fiscal 
issues may lead the states to scale back their expansions or delay those that had been 
planned for the future    24
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  Table 1 
Pre- and Post-Expansion Income 










AZ  2001  52  100 
CA  2000  112  155 
CT  2001  105  158 
DE  1996  57  100 
DC  1998  66  200 
IA  1998  67  98 
ME  1997  86  108 
MA  1997  90  133 
MI  2001  66  69 
MO  1999  48  100 
MT  1997  70  78 
NV  1997  57  134 
NH  2000  86  102 
NJ  2000  63  133 
NM  1998  62  65 
NY  2001  81  100 
ND  1999  67  74 
OH  1997  56  87 
PA  1997  65  76 
RI  1997  86  193 
SC  1998  85  96 
SD  1997  69  75 
VT  1996  103  150 
WI  2001  74  185 
Average    74  115 
Excluded are 5 states that expanded 
eligibility prior to 1995 (HI, MN, OR, 
TN, WA) and 5 states with ambiguous 
expansions (MD, NE, NC, WV, WY).  
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Table 2 
Potential Eligibility and Insurance Coverage by Income Category, Before and After Parental 
Eligibility Expansion 
 






















Pre-expansion  0.434  0.087  -0.347    0.559  0.169  -0.390 
  [12,130]  [10,201]      [25,030]  [19,929]   
Post expansion  0.387  0.117  -0.270    0.554  0.253  -0.301 
  [6,595]  [8,840]      [13,616]  [17,348]   
Difference  -0.047  0.030  0.077    -0.005  0.084  0.089 
               


















Pre-expansion  0.240  0.661  0.421    0.229  0.639  0.410 
               
Post expansion  0.278  0.664  0.386    0.252  0.614  0.362 
               
Difference  0.038  0.003  -0.035    0.023  -0.025  -0.048 
               


















Pre-expansion  0.674  0.748  0.074    0.787  0.808  0.021 
               
Post expansion  0.666  0.781  0.115    0.806  0.867  0.061 
               
Difference  -0.008  0.033  0.041    0.019  0.059  0.040 
 
Note: Numbers in square brackets are cell sizes. 
Table 3 
Estimates of the Effects of Parental Medicaid Expansions  
    Mothers        Children   
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Medicaid  Private  Any    Medicaid  Private  Any 
Target group  -0.283  0.329  0.046    -0.214  0.320  0.106 
  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.029)    (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.034) 
Target x post-expansion  0.027  -0.013  0.014    0.053  -0.012  0.041 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013)    (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
Target x reform  0.059  -0.011  0.048    0.013  -0.011  0.002 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)    (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.016) 
Target x unemp  -0.001  0.003  0.001    -0.014  0.002  -0.012 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Less than HS  0.184  -0.308  -0.124    0.214  -0.301  -0.087 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
HS diploma  0.112  -0.177  -0.065    0.127  -0.176  -0.049 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)    (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
Some college  0.085  -0.115  -0.030    0.085  -0.113  -0.029 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
Age<30  0.100  -0.055  0.045    0.034  -0.076  -0.042 
  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)    (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.017) 
30<=Age<40  0.028  0.019  0.048    -0.056  -0.000  -0.057 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)    (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.016) 
40<=Age<50  0.008  0.058  0.066    -0.068  0.026  -0.042 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)    (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.016) 
Single  0.172  -0.117  0.056    0.175  -0.101  0.073 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
One child  -0.085  -0.015  -0.099    -0.084  -0.011  -0.095 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)    (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
2 or 3 kids  -0.054  0.012  -0.043    -0.046  0.016  -0.030 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)    (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Age of youngest child  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001    -0.005  0.001  -0.004 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Black  0.097  -0.082  0.016    0.128  -0.129  -0.001 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)    (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Hispanic  -0.008  -0.126  -0.134    0.055  -0.140  -0.085 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)    (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Other race/ethnicity  0.048  -0.113  -0.064    0.111  -0.144  -0.032 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)    (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
Recently pregnant  0.056  -0.003  0.053         
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)         
Child's age          -0.002  -0.001  -0.003 
          (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Infant          0.026  -0.011  0.014 
          (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Target x CHIP          0.013  -0.022  -0.009 
          (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Target x Medicaid          -0.005  -0.006  -0.011 
          (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Observations  37766  37766  37766    75923  75923  75923 
R-squared  0.228  0.269  0.078    0.238  0.263  0.064 




Estimates of the Effects of Parental Medicaid Expansions, by Race and Ethnicity 
    Mothers      Children   
A. Whites  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Medicaid  Private  Any  Medicaid  Private  Any 
Target group  -0.185  0.224  0.038  -0.150  0.191  0.040 
  (0.033)  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.050)  (0.056)  (0.046) 
Target x post-expansion  -0.001  -0.013  -0.013  0.032  -0.007  0.025 
  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.020) 
Target x reform  0.015  0.044  0.059  -0.022  0.047  0.024 
  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.022) 
Target x unemp  -0.009  0.016  0.007  -0.012  0.017  0.005 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Target x CHIP        0.014  -0.019  -0.005 
        (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Target x Medicaid        -0.011  -0.006  -0.017 
        (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
Observations  18968  18968  18968  37409  37409  37409 
R-squared  0.206  0.242  0.058  0.195  0.216  0.053 
             
    Mothers      Children   
B. Blacks  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Medicaid  Private  Any  Medicaid  Private  Any 
Target group  -0.438  0.472  0.034  -0.435  0.532  0.096 
  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.089)  (0.111)  (0.109)  (0.089) 
Target x post-expansion  0.068  -0.024  0.044  0.078  -0.015  0.063 
  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.035) 
Target x reform  0.091  -0.033  0.057  0.028  -0.015  0.014 
  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.042) 
Target x unemp  0.000  -0.006  -0.006  0.000  -0.012  -0.011 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.013) 
Target x CHIP        0.050  -0.076  -0.027 
        (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.017) 
Target x Medicaid        0.012  -0.045  -0.033 
        (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.017) 
Observations  4772  4772  4772  10065  10065  10065 
R-squared  0.321  0.311  0.064  0.292  0.288  0.063 
 
    Mothers      Children   
C. Hispanics  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Medicaid  Private  Any  Medicaid  Private  Any 
Target group  -0.474  0.319  -0.155  -0.458  0.335  -0.123 
  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.079)  (0.086)  (0.093)  (0.097) 
Target x post-expansion  0.048  -0.005  0.042  0.067  -0.037  0.030 
  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.028) 
Target x reform  0.152  -0.056  0.096  0.124  -0.054  0.071 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
Target x unemp  0.024  0.003  0.027  0.011  -0.000  0.011 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Target x CHIP        0.017  -0.014  0.003 
        (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
Target x Medicaid        0.021  0.004  0.025 
        (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Observations  12079  12079  12079  24435  24435  24435 
R-squared  0.211  0.181  0.070  0.224  0.180  0.073 
Standard errors in parentheses. In addition to the variables shown, the regressions include all variables shown in 
Table 3 as well as a full set of state-year dummies.  
 